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Challenges and prospects for trans-boundary 
fisheries in Lakes Chiuta and Kariba 
Webster Whande, Isaac Malasha & Friday Njaya
Community-based conservation (CBC) is a prominent feature of conservation and development policy and practice in southern 
Africa. It is a generic concept defining different configurations of controlling access to and use of land and natural resources in 
southern Africa – and has led to the development of policies and legislation in support of community-based natural resources 
management (CBNRM) and co-management arrangements. Both concepts largely revolve around the premise of devolution of 
control and management authority over natural resources to facilitate conservation and use of, and local access to, resources. 
A focus on regional economic integration has offered an opportunity for extending the experiences of CBNRM and co-
management to resources occurring along international boundaries. Different trans-boundary natural resources management 
(TBNRM) programmes have been initiated in southern Africa. The experience of two inshore fisheries on Lakes Chiuta and 
Kariba highlights the challenges of TBNRM, especially at local resource users’ level. A proposal for meaningful engagement 
of local resource-dependent people is suggested in the form of a trans-boundary commons regulated through co-management 
institutions. Broad implications of this suggestion, including terrestrial TBNRM progammes, are briefly discussed. 
No. 21
Introduction
CBC is a prominent feature of  conservation and deve-
lopment policy and practice in southern Africa. It has 
been implemented or attempted in various forms across 
different resource sectors such as wildlife, forestry 
and fisheries. The most prominent approach has been 
community-based natural resources management and has 
involved attempted devolution of  control and management 
authority over natural resources to local resource users. It 
is now acknowledged that what is being implemented is 
a decentralisation of  administrative functions to local 
government structures. It has been widely associated with 
the wildlife sector. Secondly, co-management arrangements 
involving local resource users, government agencies and 
private sector have emerged as an important approach to 
CBC, notably for forestry and fishery resources. 
Over the last few years, policy pronouncements have 
emphasised the importance of  CBC across political 
boundaries. Whilst trans-boundary natural resources 
management has largely depended on states, national and 
international NGOs and the private sector for leadership 
and financial support, it is clear that local resource users 
can play an important role in their success. However, 
the actual nature of  involvement of  local resource users 
who live in these boundary areas has remained marginal 
to official decision-making processes. Secondly, different 
resource regulatory systems in neighbouring countries 
have generated conflicts among local resource users. 
Whilst at the state political and technical level there 
are strategies and structures for co-operation in natural 
resources management, this has not translated into tangible 
collaboration at local levels. Inshore artisanal fisheries 
display some of  the characteristics and the dilemmas 
faced at a local level in attempting TBNRM. This brief  
discusses the possibility of  implementing TBNRM at local 
levels through the recognition of  common fishing waters 
(commons) among inshore fishers from riparian states. It 
also briefly discusses the implications of  this suggestion 
on TBNRM, specifically as it relates to terrestrial 
resources where definition of  political boundaries is more 
pronounced. 
Understanding CBC and TBNRM
CBC is understood to encompass a wide range of  projects 
and programmes including co-management, CBNRM, and 
integrated conservation and development programmes 
(ICDPs) (Adams & Hulme 2001). A central feature of  
these projects and programmes is that they are based on 
the assumption that ‘conservation goals should be pursued 
by strategies that emphasise the role of  local residents in 
decision making about natural resources’ (Adams & Hulme 
2001:13). They developed in response to growing land 
and natural resources conflicts between local resource-
dependent people and the state over ‘fortress conservation’ 
– which emphasised the exclusion of  people from nature, 
and a technical state-centric approach to biodiversity 
conservation. 
The evolution of  CBC took place in the context of  
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natural resources, participatory development, and social 
justice through conservation (Jones & Murphree 2004; 
Hulme & Murphree 2001). Linkages between conservation 
and development, often involving sustainable use of  
natural resources, led to various forms of  natural resources 
management projects and programmes. In southern 
Africa, CBC has predominantly been in the form of  
CBNRM and involved attempts at devolution of  control 
and management authority over state-held resources, 
particularly wildlife resources (Murombedzi 1996). It 
has been emphasised that clearly defined communities 
are more interested in sustainable use of  local resources 
than other actors such as government and private sector 
interests (Malasha 2005). Resource access and use is 
regulated through local management rules premised on 
collective ownership. 
Collective proprietorship was specifically relevant 
following Garett Hardin’s ‘tragedy of  the commons’ thesis 
(1968), which argued that individuals’ decisions were 
influenced by self-interest. Competition for resources and 
the lack of  incentives to act for the common good, argued 
Hardin, lead individuals to make decisions that eventually 
have negative consequences for the conservation of  
resources. Hardin’s thesis further entrenched the notion 
that government intervention and privatisation of  
resources was best for conservation (Steins & Edwards 
1999). However, state-centric technical approaches to 
conservation proved not to be the panacea implied in 
Hardin’s arguments, in lieu of  the central role played by 
natural resources in sustaining rural people’s livelihoods. 
At the same time, research started pointing out that access 
to and use of  common property resources is subject to 
governance rules; and was not open access as implied by 
Hardin (Bromley 1992; Ostrom 1990). These findings were 
influential in the formulation of  CBNRM programmes 
in southern Africa. CBNRM was accompanied by the 
formation of  local institutions to which control and 
management authority could be devolved; and policies 
instituted that allowed the central state to decentralise 
responsibilities to local state related institutions.
The strategic importance of  rural resources provided 
an opportunity for CBNRM experiences to be expanded 
across boundaries. A suitable political environment was 
created through the mandating of  the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) to deal with issues 
of  regional integration. An outcome of  increased co-
operation among states has been TBNRM, argued to be:
Any form of  co-operation to facilitate management of  resources 
across international boundaries that facilitates or improves 
the management of  natural resources. (Griffin et al. 1999; 
Katerere et al. 2001). 
TBNRM is explained as an outcome of  regional 
integration for economic development (Mombeshora 
2005). Related to economic integration has been the 
argument that TBNRM stands to contribute to long-term 
peace and security efforts through state co-operation and 
the channelling of  financial resources into environmental 
management across boundaries. Secondly, it is argued on 
the basis that the partitioning of  Africa and other former 
colonial territories disrupted continuous ecosystems. It 
is emphasised that to successfully manage and protect 
resources, an ecosystem approach is required. TBNRM 
is therefore viewed as strategic for the management of  
shared ecological systems such as watersheds, river systems 
and migratory species (Swatuk 2005). Whilst it is agreed 
that TBNRM programmes create conditions for economic 
integration and ecosystem-level management, it remains 
unclear how local resource-dependent people are going 
to be part of  the management regime. An assumption has 
been made that community issues are addressed through 
scaling up CBNRM experiences to a TBNRM level. 
However, an analysis of  the different perspectives of  
TBNRM elicits a different picture. Take one perspective 
– TBNRM schemes are said to take different forms 
consisting of  different land uses, at the core being 
protected areas – hence trans-boundary protected areas 
(TBPAs). Such protected areas are usually surrounded by 
trans-frontier conservation areas (TFCAs), where some 
form of  regulated resource use by local communities is 
permitted. It is in these areas where a genuine linkage 
between CBNRM and TBNRM can be made through 
extending devolved control and management authority 
across boundaries through already established local 
institutions. As a result, the term TFCA is often used 
interchangeably with TBNRM. Yet conditions in these 
areas act against linking CBNRM experiences to TBNRM 
implementation. Firstly, after years of  strict enforcement 
of  boundaries in these zones, approaches to state security 
have always been conceptualised at a national level. 
Between South Africa and Zimbabwe, for instance, the 
presence of  the military along the South African side 
continues to hinder any meaningful local approaches to 
issues of  peace and security, let alone local trans-boundary 
approaches to resources management. 
Secondly, CBNRM policies in neighbouring countries 
differ in terms of  their emphasis on where power and 
authority over resources should be decentralised to, making 
it incompatible to have trans-boundary co-management of  
natural resources (Buzzard 2001). For instance, within 
the Great Limpopo Trans-Frontier Conservation Area 
(GLTFA), neighbouring villages between South Africa 
and Zimbabwe are involved in some form of  CBNRM 
with different conditions for sustainable use of  resources. 
Whilst consumptive use is allowed for communities 
involved in the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe, 
in South Africa the focus has been more on eco-tourism 
development. 
TBNRM initiatives have borrowed from CBNRM 
the central role of  the market in generating income for 
different actors involved. This has largely been in the form 
of  promoting tourism in areas earmarked for TBNRM. But 
not all TBNRM arrangements have potential for tourism 
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development, as some are in remote areas that do not have 
the infrastructure to attract tourists. A second motivation 
for TBNRM is conservation through ecosystem-wide and 
bioregional planning approaches. It has been argued that 
the focus on tourism and ecosystem-wide conservation 
does not create real opportunities for equitable access 
to resources by poor rural people (Dzingirai 2004). 
Experiences in southern Africa point to a need to 
emphasise the definition of  TBNRM schemes along the 
lines of  informal resource use – including illegal uses – that 
occurs across boundaries (see Jones & Chonguica 2001). 
An understudy of  trans-boundary inshore fisheries and 
their role in sustaining livelihood needs provide a possible 
basis for instituting TBNRM. 
Background to Lakes Chiuta and Kariba
This brief  is based on research involving two inland water 
lakes located along international boundaries: Lake Chiuta 
between Malawi and Mozambique, and Lake Kariba 
between Zambia and Zimbabwe (Malasha 2005; Njaya 
2005). 
Lake Chiuta
Before 1970, Lake Chiuta had similar management 
regimes in both Malawi and Mozambique, with traditional 
leaders allocating sites to fishers. Due to its small size and 
remoteness, there was no formal recognition of  the fishery 
by the Malawi Department of  Fisheries (MDoF), although 
catch data and extension services were being done on the 
Malawian side of  the lake. However, transformation of  
the fishery from a traditional to a commercial orientation, 
with the introduction of  seine nets that were not allowed 
by the local fishers, created conflicts between the resident 
and migrant fishers. As a conflict resolution measure, a 
co-management arrangement on the Malawian side was 
established in the 1990s whereby the local fishers sought 
support from the MDoF, leading to the formation of  local 
beach village committees (BVCs). Two factors necessitated 
the formation of  BVCs. Firstly; the local Malawian fishers 
wanted the MDoF to evict seine fishers with whom they 
competed for fish. Secondly, it mirrored a more general 
and wide acceptance of  local people’s role in managing 
natural resources, which manifested itself  in terms of  co-
management arrangements in fisheries. 
On the Mozambique side, however, traditional leaders 
continued to play a more central role in controlling access 
to, and use of, fisheries on Lake Chiuta. One outcome 
of  this was that the strict control of  access to and use 
of  resources experienced on the Malawian side was not 
implemented in Mozambique. A contributing factor in 
this regard might be that a protracted civil war from the 
1970s to the 1990s which diminished the role of  the state 
in remote areas along Mozambique’s vast international 
boundaries. Presently, seine fishers are still allowed only 
on the Mozambican side, creating conflict over approaches 
to resource access and control between the two countries. 
Thus, whilst Malawi and Mozambique have made policy 
pronouncements in favour of  TBNRM, conflicting 
policies and approaches to controlling access make the 
actual realisation of  shared management responsibilities 
difficult to achieve. 
Lake Kariba
The Lake Kariba case study also displays these differences, 
with variations only in detail. The Zambian shores of  Lake 
Kariba have been under the authority of  the Department 
of  Fisheries (ZDoF). Upon completion of  the construction 
of  Lake Kariba, artisanal fishers were allowed to fish 
along the whole Zambian shoreline. The fishers did not 
have restrictions on the amount of  gear they could have. 
Fishery resource exploitation in Zambia mirrored macro-
economic problems – fishers moved into the area in times 
of  economic hardship. A co-management arrangement 
was started in the 1990s through decentralisation of  
management over fisheries; and instituted the involvement 
of  local fishers and traditional authorities in zonal 
management committees (ZMCs). 
On the Zimbabwean side, however, the area is 
a recreational park under the authority of  the National 
Parks and Wildlife Authority (NPWA). The NPWA has 
historically been in charge of  controlling access to and use 
of  fisheries within the recreational zone through the issuing 
of  permits. This system, however, led to conflicts between 
local fishers whose livelihoods depended on having access 
to and use of  fishery resources within Lake Kariba, and 
other lake users, especially the tourist industry. In 1993, 
the NPWA decentralised some management authority 
over exclusive fishing zones (EFZs) for artisanal fishers. 
The decentralisation process was based on the Communal 
Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) model, which conferred ‘appropriate 
authority’ status to fishermen in defined EFZs through 
rural district councils (RDCs). The Lake Kariba case 
study further highlights the differences in management 
approaches between Zambia and Zimbabwe. The different 
regimes have been sources of  conflicts between Zambian 
and Zimbabwean artisanal fishers at the Mlibizi Basin, 
where the Lake is so narrow that artisanal fishers from the 
two countries compete for the same fishing waters. In the 
absence of  a co-management framework for exploiting the 
resources between the two countries and respective fishers, 
the narrow channel has highlighted the challenges faced in 
attempting TBNRM at a local level. These challenges are 
expected to be more pronounced when conceptions of  
boundaries are clearer, for example, where rivers separate 
countries as opposed to boundaries on lakes, which are 
more difficult to clearly pinpoint.
TBNRM around Lakes Chiuta and Kariba
The demarcation of  boundaries under colonialism 
resulted in different governance systems surrounding the 
emerging states. In turn the governance regime affected 
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how natural resources were accessed and used by local 
resource-dependent people. In the fisheries of  Lakes 
Chiuta and Kariba, different management systems have 
been implemented, ranging from strict control of  access 
to and use of  resources to a laissez-faire approach. The 
Mozambican inshore fishery along Lake Chiuta has retained 
a central role for traditional leaders in the allocation of  
fishing rights, whilst on the same lake in Malawi the state 
was actively involved in controlling access to and use of  
fisheries. On Lake Kariba, Zambian fishers have been 
allowed to maximise fish production to meet the demand 
from urban areas. On the Zimbabwean side, however, 
certain areas of  the lake are closed off  to artisanal fishers. 
The situation in the Mlibizi Basin indicates that differences 
in management approach along international boundaries 
may give rise to conflict.
The first source of  conflict has been around different 
fishing regulations. On the Lake Kariba inshore at Mlibizi 
Basin, differences between the two countries include the 
number of  gill nets a fisher can own and the mesh-size of  
the nets. Zambian fishers are allowed more nets, and their 
mesh-size is much smaller than on the Zimbabwean side. 
This enables the Zambian fishers to catch more fish and 
gives rise to conflict with their Zimbabwean counterparts. 
In Lake Chiuta the disagreement between Malawi and 
Mozambique is largely around seine nets. In the early 1990s, 
local fishers on the Malawian side requested the assistance 
of  the MDoF to evict more that 300 seine net fishers who 
were on the Malawian side. Although most of  these seine 
fishers are now on the Mozambique side, they continue to 
impact on the availability of  fish in Malawi because both 
sides exploit the same resource. Whilst Malawi has a mesh-
size limit, such a limit has yet to be implemented on the 
Mozambican side of  the lake. 
The second area that has generated conflict among 
artisanal fishers across the different countries and between 
fishers and authorities pertains to fishing waters. The 
Zambian shoreline was classified as ‘native reserve area’ 
where artisanal fishing was allowed without any restrictions. 
On the Zimbabwean side, however, most of  the area has 
been set aside for recreational purposes and is not available 
for artisanal fisheries except around designated EFZs. The 
artisanal fishers at Mlibizi Basin have encroached into 
restricted fishing areas, causing conflict with the NPWA 
and private safari operators. In essence, this conflict is as 
much about breaking rules around fishing waters, hence 
about authority, as it is about competing with safari 
operators who use the area for sport fishing. 
A third conflict issue is around the marketing of  fish. 
Because the Zambian fishers are located far from their 
fish markets in Lusaka, they land their fish on the Binga 
market in Zimbabwe, albeit informally. A reciprocal 
system has developed between Zimbabwean authorities 
and the Zambian fishers where the fishers may land their 
fish in exchange for selling the fish at a lower price. This 
has generated conflict with the Zimbabwean fishers who 
feel the Zambians are undercutting them. Coupled with 
higher catches due to the smaller mesh size, Zambians 
have an advantage over the fishers on the other side of  the 
border. 
As much as these are conflict areas among artisanal 
fishers across the four countries, they also present an 
opportunity for trans-boundary co-operation. Any 
meaningful engagement with this process has to recognise 
the centrality of  inshore fisheries in sustaining local 
livelihoods. It also has to be emphasised that, whilst this 
conflict is largely between the artisanal fishers, its source 
is different policies within riparian states. Thus, potential 
solutions to these conflicts have to be approached at 
different levels – ranging from local resource-dependent 
people to national-level government officials. 
Framework for TBNRM fisheries
It is often argued that TBNRM initiatives can contribute 
to peace, security and long-term stability. The SADC 
treaty for regional integration and co-operation in the 
management of  shared natural resources provides a basis 
for the resolution of  conflicts around trans-boundary 
inshore fisheries. SADC has also put in place other 
protocols aimed at increasing co-operation in conservation 
and natural resources management efforts.1 The four 
countries discussed here are already implementing 
TBNRM initiatives.2 Zambia and Zimbabwe are also 
members of  the Zambezi Watercourse Commission, 
whose role is to resolve conflicts and foster an awareness 
of  equitable utilisation of  natural resources within the 
Zambezi watercourse. At the level of  artisanal fishers, the 
four countries have put in place policies for decentralising 
management authority to local resource users. 
The Zimbabwe approach has been structured along 
the CAMPFIRE model which involves decentralising 
management to an ‘appropriate authority’ status over 
fishing zones. In Zambia, the fisheries co-management 
arrangements followed on experiences with Administrative 
Management Design for Game Management Areas 
(ADMADE) which aimed at involving communities in 
managing wildlife. Malawi and Mozambique are also 
pursuing co-management arrangements in their respective 
inshore fisheries. Despite the similarity in policies for 
involving local resource users in the management of  
inshore fisheries, conflicts are still prevalent, especially as 
a result of  different regulatory systems in the countries 
discussed here. 
An issue that needs to be addressed around both 
inshore fisheries is the impression that fishers from the 
different countries are competing. As noted above, this 
has arisen largely due to different fishing regulations. 
These differences are exacerbated by the fact that when 
the co-management arrangements were instituted, they did 
not include cross-border collaboration among institutions 
at a local level and the fishers themselves. Thus, despite 
the articulation of  ecosystem benefits through TBNRM, 
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this has remained a neglected area in inshore fisheries 
even at a policy level. Efforts should be made in this 
regard to transform local-level institutional structures for 
co-management to serve trans-boundary artisanal fishery 
interests; and act as a platform for resolving some of  the 
conflicts experienced. 
The perceived value of  artisanal fisheries has also 
contributed to the low priority afforded to a trans-
boundary arrangement at a local level. Compared with 
other economic activities such as tourism (on Lake 
Kariba), artisanal fisheries are regarded as contributing 
little to the gross domestic product of  the countries 
involved. This is despite their central role in sustaining 
local people’s livelihoods and as safety nets for the 
vulnerable poor. These challenges indicate that despite 
the existence of  various international instruments meant 
to promote TBNRM among the countries involved, a 
more appropriate approach premised on managing local 
resource conflicts in the trans-boundary setting is needed. 
Additionally, such an approach should guarantee access to 
and use of  resources by the poor, hence secure livelihood 
sources for the most vulnerable. 
Malasha (2005) proposes the creation of  a commons 
within the Mlibizi Basin. This is also possible for the Lake 
Chiuta trans-boundary co-management. In both cases, 
as suggested by Malasha, joint commissions between the 
countries involved can be the framework within which 
the commons are established. This enables fishers from 
the countries involved to jointly address conflict issues 
such as fishing regulations. Additionally, it provides 
a platform for discussing these issues with policy and 
decision-makers taking part on the joint commissions. The 
joint commissions can work with local stakeholder fora 
comprising local committees, local authority structures, 
and tour operators. Areas of  conflict between different 
shoreline uses would also be discussed through such fora.  
A commons would further act as a safety valve for 
people who lose their sources of  livelihood, including 
those in formal employment in the cities. A commons 
arrangement would further act to ensure access to and 
use of  resources through regulation by co-management 
institutions whose trans-boundary mandate is not 
constrained by bureaucracy. 
Implications for other forms of TBNRM
This framework has implications for other TBNRM 
initiatives, whether they have narrow rivers for boundaries, 
or ‘fuzzy’ boundaries such as mountain ranges. There is 
clearly an overlapping of  resource-use in the two lakes 
discussed here, owing to lack of  clarity of  where exact 
boundaries lie and the fact that fish move at will through 
human-made territorial boundaries on the lakes. Where such 
demarcations are perceived to be clearer, as in separation 
through a narrow river, nationally-based administrative 
practices might present more challenges to co-operation 
across international boundaries. At the same time, illegal 
resource use across boundaries makes the need for setting 
up a commons even more critical. For instance, the use 
of  non-fugitive resources such as grazing pastures raises 
issues of  cross-border cattle theft. Instituting a commons 
presents opportunities to deal with conflicts arising from 
informal use across boundaries to be addressed through 
cross border co-management institutions. The promotion 
of  tourism across boundaries has been criticised for 
perpetuating differences in investment in different 
countries. A commons management structure can address 
questions of  uneven development in TBNRM areas. In this 
regard, a commons arrangement would have to address the 
issues of  benefit-distribution as well as equitable access to, 
and use of, resources. 
Conclusion
This brief  set out to highlight the challenges and prospects 
for involvement of  resource-users around trans-boundary 
fisheries. Whilst the countries involved have instituted 
CBNRM initiatives and are implementing TBNRM 
programmes, the actual contribution of  local resource-
users remains undefined. It has been noted that, whilst 
at a political and technical level there is a platform for 
trans-boundary engagement, this still has to be realised at 
a local level. Differences between the countries in terms of  
policies of  controlling access to and use of  resources have 
led to local conflicts among fishers, as some have extracted 
more resources from the same ecosystem. It is suggested 
that meaningful engagement with local resource users in 
trans-boundary fisheries might be possible through the 
establishment of  commons, whose use is regulated by 
trans-boundary co-management institutions. A further 
suggestion in this regard is for technical managers in 
the riparian states to discuss and manage local conflicts 
through adopting similar fishery regulations. The adoption 
of  similar regulatory systems would provide a favourable 
environment for facilitating co-operation among local 
co-management institutions. Such an environment should 
also facilitate security of  livelihoods for local resource-
dependent people. 
Endnotes
1 SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement; SADC Protocol on Shared Water 
Courses; SADC Protocol on Fisheries.
2 Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique TBNRM 
initiative; Lake Chiuta Trans-Boundary Co-Management 
initiative for Malawi and Mozambique.
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